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F.: Criminal Law--Trial Procedure--Improper Remarks of Prosecutor as
CASE COMMENTS

rights than any other individual at a criminal trial, seem to contradict one of the basic reasons asserted in support of the public's
right to attend such trials, that is to insure that the defendant is
fairly dealt with and not unjustly condemned. State v. Sheppard,
100 Ohio App. 345, 128 N.E.2d 471, aff'd, 165 Ohio St. 293, 135
N.E.2d 340 (1955). As advanced in New York, Post Corp. v.
Liebowitz, 163 N.Y.S.2d 409, 148 N.E.2d 256 (1957), "the function
of publicity of a trial especially in the form of newspaper reporting
and comment, is one of the fundamental safeguards of a free
society." What better means would be available to subject the
trial to the fullest public scrutiny?
The court's decision in this case falls within the majority view
upholding the exclusion of the public from a criminal trial in this
instance. For a similar case see State v. Poindexter, supra.
It is submitted that, in the majority of these cases comprising
the exceptions to the general rule as to public trial, the word
"public" has been given the interpretation of "not secret". Since it
was the intention of the lawmakers to do away with secret trials,
the courts have effectuated that purpose. However, the presence of
the press in the courtroom, especially in the cases dealing with these
exceptions, might contribute an added incentive towards a fair
trial and certainly there could be no question of great concern as
to the public nature of the trial.
G. D. G.

Cmrnu
.L LAw-TnLtL PRo
uEDUm-IMPROPER
REmAS OF
PROSECUTOR AS GROUNDS FOR REvERsAL.-From a judgment on con-

viction for first degree murder, defendant sought a writ of error.
Held, reversing the criminal court, although the evidence presented
a jury question, conviction should be reversed because of admission
of prejudicial evidence and because of highly prejudicial conduct
on the part of the prosecuting attorney. People v. Dukes, 146 N.E.2d
14 (Il. 1947).
In a criminal case the prosecuting attorney is placed in an
anomalous position. It is not only his duty to convict the defendant
but also, as an officer of the court, he must safeguard the rights of
all. Cf. State v. Lewis, 133 W. Va. 584, 57 S.E.2d 510 (1949). A
prosecuting attorney may prosecute vigorously, so long as he deals
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fairly with the accused, but he should never assume the role of a
partisan eager to convict. Here an attempt will be made to investigate the nature of improper remarks by the prosecution and the
circumstances under which such remarks may lead to reversal or
disciplinary action.
The principal case illustrates some of the most common types
of misconduct by the prosecution's argument of matters not in
evidence and the inflammatory appeal by suggesting that the jury
convict because of matters external to the trial record. There,
although the record disclosed nothing concerning the character of
the deceased, the prosecutor continually extolled his virtues. In his
closing argument prosecutor referred to an alias when there was
no evidence thereof. Also, argument of an inflammatory nature
was introduced to the effect that the deceased left a wife and family.
It is universally held that appellate courts have the power to
review the conduct of the prosecutor if the proper procedure is
followed. Ippolito v. United States, 108 F.2d 668 (6th Cir. 1940);
State v. Hawley, 229 N.C. 167, 48 S.E.2d 85 (1948). All that is
necessary to effectuate the review is that the defense counsel make
timely objections, since by a failure to do so it is presumed that
the defendant did not think his case was harmed. See e.g., State
v. Simon, 182 W. Va. 322, 52 S.E.2d 725 (1949); Espy v. State,
54 Wyo. 291, 92 P.2d 549 (1939). However, the finding of some
misconduct does not necessarily lead to reversal. The appellate
court must be convinced that the misconduct was prejudicial to the
defendant. United States v. Weiss, 103 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1939);
State v. Curotz, 93 S.E.2d 519 (W. Va. 1956); People v. Wayne, 117
Cal. App. 2d 268, 256 P.2d 62 (1953).
Since improper remarks of the prosecutor are not in themselves
grounds for reversal, the problem of the appellate courts is to determine whether and to what extent the jury was influenced by a given
argument as it occurred at the trial. See e.g., Pierce v. United
States, 86 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1936); People v. Swanson, 278 App.
Div. 846, 104 N.Y.S.2d 400 (1951). The actual effect of an argument on the jury is largely a matter of speculation, thus the necessity of considering each case on its own facts, rather than applying
rigid rules, is frequently emphasized. Cf. Pitts v. State, 211 Miss.
268, 51 So. 2d 448 (1951); People v. Alexander, 92 Cal. App. 2d
230, 206 P.2d 657 (1949). Nevertheless, certain standards have
been developed to aid the appellate courts in making their deter-
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minations. It has already been mentioned that the defendant must
make timely objections to the improper evidence or remarks. State
v. Lewis, supra. Another consideration is that the appellate court
must rely only upon the record, while the trial judge actually heard
the remarks and is better able to determine their effect on the jury.
Thus every doubt as to the circumstances not appearing on the
record must be resolved in favor of the view taken by the trial judge.
E.g., State v. Lewis, 133 W. Va. 584, 57 S.E.2d 518 (1949); Commonwealth v. Turza, 340 Pa. 128, 16 A.2d 401 (1940); Lang v. State,
137 Fla. 128, 187 So. 786 (1939). Probably the most conclusive
test is that if the appellate court determines that the misconduct
is substantial, that is, that it probably influenced the jury, then
reversal will follow unless it appears that the same verdict would
have been returned if the improper argument had not been made.
Pacman v. United States, 144 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1944); State v.
Gilstrap, 205 S.C. 412, 416 S.E.2d 163 (1944); State v. Barone, 92
Utah 571, 70 P.2d 735 (1937).
The basic objective of reversal is to assure the defendant a fair
trial and not to castigate the prosecutor. Cf. United States v. Lotsch,
102 F.2d 35 (2d Cir. 1939); People v. Stroble, 86 Cal. 2d 615, 226
P.2d 830 (1951). Thus reversal is merely a stopgap and not a preventive remedy. Improper remarks by prosecutors not only cause
added expense to the state because of the necessity for new
trial but also discredit judicial proceedings. As yet the courts
have done little by way of deterring the initial misconduct except
for a slight reprimand by the appellate courts. Cf. Tate v. Commonwealth, 258 Ky. 685, 80 S.W.2d 817 (1935); State v. Bundy, 44
S.W.2d 121 (Mo. 1931).
It is submitted that the courts can do more than has been
done in the past to deter misconduct. One way of deterring overzealous prosecutors would be to make reversals mandatory for certain specified types of misconduct. But the problem here is formulating a statute specific enough without being unwieldy because of
the unlimited types of misconduct. However, some of the more
common types could be dealt with in this manner. Another method,
referred to in several cases, would be to impose civil liability for
improper remarks by abrogating the privilege based on relevancy.
TATEMENT, ToErs § 582 (1938). Many statutes provide for removal from office of prosecuting attorneys for gross misconduct or
violation of duty by order of court after hearing. W. VA. CODE. c. 6,
art. 6, § 5 (Michie 1955); VA. CoDE § § 15-500, 15-503 (1950). How-
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ever, the courts generally have been disinclined to utilize this power
in cases of improper remarks because of the severity of the penalty.
See Note, The Imposition of DisciplinaryMeasures for the Misconduct of Attorneys, 52 CoLtrm. L. REv. 1039 (1952). Perhaps a compromise method could be found in contempt proceedings which
would make available a wide range of sanctions. Contempt is a
flexible, easily applied discipline, and has in fact been used to deter
attorneys in both civil and criminal cases. See e.g., Sacher v. United
States, 343 U.S. 1 (1952); Pace v. United States, 386 U.S. 155 (1949).
J. o. F.

Dm cEs-Loss oF EARNINGs-FEDEFA INCOmE TAx.-Action
by administrator for wrongful death of decedent who was passenger in defendant's auto which collided at intersection with
truck driven by one codefendant and owned by defendant truck
line. Held, that trial court properly instructed jury to consider
offsetting factor of probable income taxes on decedent's probable
lifetime net earnings in assessing reasonable compensation for loss
caused by destruction of decedent's earning capacity. Floyd v.
Fruit Industries, 136 A.2d 918 (Conn. 1957).
The principal case represents an effort on the part of the
forward-looking and learned Connecticut court to advance a principle unanswerable-restitutio in integrum-in the face of practical
and mechanical difficulties as well as the prevailing line of authority.
Prior American decisions have conceded that an unjust enrichment
may accrue to the plaintiff when tax liability is not deducted from
personal injury recoveries; however, they have regarded the calculation of future tax liability as too remote and speculative for
submission to a jury. See, e.g., Southern Pac. Co. v. Guthrie, 186
F.2d 926 (9th Cir. 1951); Pfister v. City of Cleveland, 96 Ohio
App. 185, 113 N.E.2d 366 (1953).
The objections to the principal case may conveniently be
categorized into four groups. First, that consideration of intricate
tax liability is a matter too complex and technical as well as speculative for consideration by a jury. See, e.g., Rouse v. New York C. &
St. L. Ry., 349 III. App. 139, 110 N.E.2d 266 (1953); Stokes v.
United States, 144 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1944). Second, that effective
tax rates in this country fluctuate and the liability of an individual
is governed by such intangibles as age, number and extent of personal deductions, etc. See, e.g., Dempsey v. Thompson, 368 Mo. 339,

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol60/iss4/12

4

